i. Introduction
Imitation plays an important role in skill acquisition -and not merely because it avoids time-consuming ti-ial-and-error learning. Observing and imitating is also a special case of the translation of sensory information into action. The actor must fa-anslate a complex dynamic visual input pattern into motor commands in such a way, that the resulting movement visually matches the model movement. For that reason, imitation is one of the most interesting examples ofperceptual-motor co-ordination.
Although humans are very successful in imitating many complex skills, the mechanisms that underlie successful imitation are poorly understood. The b-anslation problem is particularly interesting in children, because they must perform the translation despite the obviously great dififerences in orientation, body size, limb lengths, and avaUable motor skiUs. AdditionaUy, these differences result in very different dynamic properties (Meltzoff 1993) . Nevertheless, children spontaneously and continuously try to imitate the customs and skills manifested by the adults and peers.
Based on earlier findings (Meltzoff & Moore 1977) , Meltzoff and Moore (1994) developed an influential theory -the theory of active inter-modal mapping (AIM) -that assumes a supra-modal representational system that merges the perceptual and the action systems. This supra-modal representational system is thought to match visual information with proprioceptive information. The AIM theory is in line with the common view that -in imitation -perception and action are coupled by means of a direct perceptual-motor mapping (cf. e.g. , Butterworth 1990; Gray et al. 1991) .
A direct perceptual-motor mapping is also supported by neurophysiological findings. The so-caUed mirror neurones (di PeUegrino et al. 1992 ) in the monkey's pre-motor area F5 are potential candidates for a neural implementation of an observation-execution matching system, because they fire both during the observation and during the execution of particular actions. Support for a similar system in humans comes from the finding of a motor facilitation during action observation (Fadigaetal.1995) .
Unfortunately, direct-mapping theories, including AIM, cannot account for certain findings in human imitation behaviour. For example, 18-month-old children do not only re-enact an adidt's action, but are also able to infer what the adult intended to do when the model fails to perform a target act (Meltzoff 1995) . These findings suggest that young children apprehend the equivalence between acts seen and acts done not only on an inter-modal sensorial level, but also on a higher cognitive, intentional level. While direct mapping can cope with that finding by making a few additional assumptions, other robust findings are harder to explain using direct-mapping approaches. Imitation movements -especially in childrenconsistently and systematically deviate from the model movements. First of all, it is well documented that while young children spontaneously imitate adults in a mirror-like fashion, older children sometimes tend to transpose left and right (Swanson & Benton 1955; Wapner & Cirmo 1968) . Hence, if direct-mapping is the basic process for imitation, it is either less 'direct' in younger children than in older ones, or it could be better called 'direct-mirroring' in younger children than direct-mapping.' Secondly, a hand-to-ear test (originally developed for aphasics by Head in 1920) repeatedly showed that young children prefer to imitate both ipsilateral (e.g. left hand touching left ear) and contra-lateral (e.g. left hand to right ear) movements with an ipsi-lateral response (Schofield 1976) . Clearly, it is not the movement (ipsi-vs. contra-lateral) that is mapped, because it is mapped inconsistently. However, Bekkering, Wohlschlager and Gattis (2000) found that chUdren consistently reached for the "correct" ear. ' The reason for the avoidance ofcross-lateral movements in chUdren is not due to an immature bifurcation as Kephart (1960) suggested. Recently, we (Bekkering et al. 2000) showed thatbimanual contra-lateral movements (i.e. left hand to right ear and at the same time right hand to left ear) are imitated contra-laterally quite often and more fi-equendy than unimanual contra-lateral movements are, even though the bimanual movements require a double crossing of the body midline. In addition, we were able to show that unimanual contra-lateral movements are imitated contra-lateraUy if throughout the session only one ear is touched. Based on these findings, we speculated that children probably primarily imitate the goal of the model's action while paying less attention to -or not caring about -the course of the movement. However, if the goal is unambiguous (both ears are touched simultaneously) or if there is only one goal (only one ear is touched), then aspects of the movement come into play. In other words: in imitation it is primarily the goal of an act that is imitated; how that goal is achieved is of only secondary interest. Of course, perceiving the goal of an action would be a prerequisite for such
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We tested our hypothesis ofgoal-directed imitation by a variation of the handto-ear task that allowed the removal of the goal objects of the models movement.
Instead of touching the ears, the model now covered one of two adjacent dots stuck to the surface of a table with either the ipsi-or the contra-lateral hand. Results were sunilar to those of the hand-to-ear task. Children always covered the correct dot;
but they quite often used the ipsi-lateral hand when the model covered the dot contra-lateraUy. However, when the same hand-movements were performed with the dots removed, children imitated almost perfectly ipsi-lateral with ipsi-lateral ahd contra-lateral with contra-lateral movements.
Thus, it seems that in imitation the presence or absence of goal object has a decisive influence on imitation behaviour. Goal-oriented movements seem to be imitated correctly with respect to the goal; but the movement itself is frequentiy ignored. Movements without goal objects or with a single, non-ambiguous goal object are imitated more precisely. It seems that if the goal is clear (or absent), then the course of the movement plays a more central role m imitation. One might also say that then, the movement itself becomes the goal.
A goal-directed theory of imitation
Based on these results, we developed a theory of goal-directed orientation that nevertheless does not make a principle differentiation between object-oriented movements and movements lacking a goal object. It rather suggests a. Decomposition. The perceived act is cognitively decomposed into separate goal aspects;
b. Selection of goal aspects. Due to capacity limitations, only a few goal aspects are selected;
c. Hierarchical organisation. The selected goal aspects are hierarchically ordered. The hierarchy of goals follows the functionality of actions. Ends (objects and treatments) are more important than means (effectors and movement paths); d. Ideo-motor principle. The selected goals elicit the motor program with which they are most strongly associated. These motor programs are not necessarily leading to matching movements;
e. General validity. There is no principle difference in imitation behaviour between children, adults, and animals. Differences in accuracy are due to differences in working memory capacity.
The goal-directed theory of imitation does not only explain the recent data ofimitation research, but also gives imitation a more functional nature. Direct mapping, on the other hand, has a rather automatic taste. The goal-directed theory ofimitation allows imitators to learn from models even if the differences in motor skills or m body proportions are so huge that the imitator is physically unable to make the same movement as the model. Whatever movement the imitator uses, the purpose of learning by imitation can be regarded as being fulfilled as soon as he reaches the same goal as the model.
Experiments
The series of experiments presented here provides further evidence for the theory ofgoal-directed imitation. Experiment 1 tests the ideo-motor principle in children's imitation behaviour. Experiment 2 and 3 test the general validity of our goal-directed theory of imitation by using adult subjects instead of children. Experiment 2 replicates the dot experiment (see above) with adidts and thus tests the general validity of the ideo-motor principle. Experiment 3 tries to clarify the hierarchical organisation by investigating the imitation of more complex object-oriented actions in adults and thus tests the general validity of selection of goals aspects in imitation.
Experiment 1
According to the ideo-motor principle, the movements elicited by the goal of an action are those that are most strongly associated with the achievement of the goal. We ab-eady showed (Bekkering et al. 2000 ) that contra-lateral movements are quite frequendy imitated with ipsi-lateral ones (so-called contra-ipsi-error). This finding is in keeping with the ideo-motor principle, because it is qiiite likely that the more direct, ipsi-lateral movement is more strongly associated with reaching for an object than the indirect, contra-lateral one. Experiment 1 tries to show, that the contra-ipsi-error is not the only manifestation of the ideo-motor principle in imitation. One way to show that the idea-motor principle is of more general validity in imitation is to use the same spatial relations between efifectors and objects (again ipsi-and contra-lateral movements), but varying in addition the treatment of the object. Prehension movements, for example, shoiild be more strongly associated with the use of the more skiUed dominant hand, whereas the choice of the effector in pointing to an object should depend more on the spatial relation between effector and object. We therefore asked 16 children to imitate contra-and ipsi-lateral movements towards one of two objects (a comb and a pen) on the table. Half of the children were shown grasping movements, whereas the other half observed the experimenter pointing towards the objects. In the grasping condition, the dominant hand was used about twice as often as the left hand, whereas in the pointing condition hand use was balanced (see Figure 1) . Interestingly, the preference for the dominant hand m the grasping condition led to 17% ipsi-contra-errors (aU of them were made with the right hand), an ei-ror that hardly occurred in previous experiments. No such errors occurred in the pointing condition. In summary, the results of Experiment 1 demonstrate the goal-directedness of imitation, the strength of the ideo-motor principle in imitation, and that not only the objects identity (comb vs. pen), but also the treatenent of the object (grasping vs. pointing) determines which motor programme is activated.
Experiment 2
The theory ofgoal-directed imitation is thought to be valid for all individuals, irrespective of age and developmental state. However, up to now, our own evidence stems exclusively from imitation research in children. Of course, in such simple tasks like touching the contra-lateral ear, we don't expect adiilts to show the same error-prone behaviour that we found in children. Nevertheless, if the goal-directed theory of imitation is generally valid, some (perhaps weaker) effects in adult's imitation behaviour shoiild be detectable. We (Wohlschlager & Bekkering 2002) therefore replicated one ofou:: core experiments -covering dots on a table -in adults, expecting to find a reflection of the children's error pattern at a lower level in adults and in their response times (RT).
<F
igure 2. Stimuli used in Experiment 2. The adult participants had to put their hands in a position similar to that depicted in the stimuli photographs. Note that the only difference between the left and right column of photographs is in the presence of dots.
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In order to be able to measure response times precisely, we slighdy modified the task. First, we used finger movements instead of whole hand movements. Second, the model movements were not presented by the experimenter but on a computer screen. Subjects were instructed to put their hands next to each other on the table, just as depicted in the stimuli (see Figure 2) , and to imitate the depicted downward finger movement as quickly as possible after the presentation of one of the stimuli. As in the experiment with chUdren, there were two conditions. In one condition, the stimuli contained two dots, one of which was covered by one of the fingers at the end of an either ipsi-lateral or contra-lateral downward movement.
In the other condition, the stimuli depicted the same movements, but there were no dots present.
Twelve adult subjects went through both, the dots and the no-dots condition, in blocks. Results showed that although adults almost made no errors (0.6%), these few errors mainly (77.8%) occurred with stimuli depicting conti-a-lateral movements towards dots (contra-ipsi error). Second, RT were faster for ipsi-lateral movements, but only if dots were present (see Figure 3) . These results, that basically replicate the findings in chUdren, show that also in adults dots as action goals are activating the direct, ipsi-lateral motor programme, which leads to faster responses and sometimes even to errors. Although adults show the same effects as children in simple actions, more complex actions are needed to investigate the general validity and the hierarchical organisation of our goal-directed theory of imitation. Currendy, we have only data from actions that comprise two variable aspects: the goal object and the efifector. In the following experiment, we increased the number to four variable aspects: the goal object, the treatment of the object, the effector, and the movement path. Given the higher complexity, we expected also adiilts to show a substantial number of errors in imitation. Ranking the different error types according to the number of errors should yield insight into the hierarchy of goal aspects. We expected the subjects to show the least number of errors in choosing the object and the treatment, whereas the choice of the efifector and the movement path should be quite error-prone.
The action we used was more complex but nevertheless quite simple. It consisted of moving a pen upside down into one of two cups (object) or touching the cup's handle with the pen's cap (treatment). In either case, the pen had to rotated by 180°. The experimenter served as the model and he either used his right or his left hand (effector). In addition, he either turned the pen clockwise or counterclockwise (movement path) to bring it into an upside down position at the end of the movement (see Figure 4) . 32 adiilts served as participants in the experiment. They were kept naive about the purpose of the experiment. Before showing the action to them, they were simply asked Can you do what I do?" We were interested in "spontaneous imitation" and therefore we ran only one trial for each subject. The results showed that indeed, adults produced a considerable amount of errors if the action that has to be imitated gets more complex. Actually, only 10 subjects exactly copied the model's movement. As suggested by the theory ofgoaldirected imitation, most errors were made due to using the wrong movement path, followed by the wrong effector. The treatment was almost always imitated correctly. The error rate for the object depended on whether the two cups were of the same or of different colour. If the objects had the same colour, subjects randomly chose one of the objects. However, if the objects had different colours, the cup with colour corresponding to the cup the experimenter used was chosen (see Figure 5 ). This last finding illustrates the goal-oriented nature of imitation. If an object is uniquely identifiable, it is considered the unique goal of an action. However, if there are several similar ones around, imitation picks out an arbitrary one, ignoring the location of the object. As a consequence, the choice of the effector and the movement path just follow what is necessary to achieve the goal. In fact, subjects ahnost always used their right hand to grasp the pen and put it into the cup (thus replicating the finding of Experiment 3 in adults).
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Discussion
In this chapter we reported a series of experiments that demonstrate the importance of objects and their treatments in human imitation, both for children and adults. The experiments showed that it is primarily the treatment of an object that is imitated in object-oriented actions, whereas the choice of the effector and the movement path are following the so-caUed ideo-motor principle: The motor programme most strongly associated with the achievement of the goal is activated during the execution of the imitative act and it is probably already executed during the observation of the action that is imitated later on (Fadiga et al. 1995) . This motor programme leads in most cases to the most direct and effective movement.
In contrast to current theories that explain imitation by a direct mapping of visual input onto motor output, our new goal-directed theory of imitation states that the matching takes place between action goals. Actions involving objects are thus imitated in such a way, that the same treatment is done to the same object, thereby
The role of obj ects in imitation ill ignoring the motor part of the action. Of course, in most cases the model acts in an ef&cient and direct way on the object. If the imitator copies the action goal and if this action goal in turn activates the most direct motor programme in the imitator, then both actions resemble each other in aU aspects, leading to an impressive, mirror-like behaviour. When there is no object, the movements themselves become the goal and they are also imitated in a mirror-like fashion. It is probably the fi-equendy observed parallelism between the movements of the model and the imitator, that led to direct-mapping theories. However, according to our new theory of goal-directed imitation, this simUarity between the movements of the model and the imitator is only superficial and incidental: the underlying similarity is a similarity of goals and intentions.
Imitating goals and/or intentions of course requires that the imitator understands the action of the model. In our view, thus action understanding is a prerequisite for imitation. It is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for imitation to occur: Within a goal-directed theory (as opposed to direct-mapping explanations) it is possible to explain why imitation sometimes occurs and sometimes not. Because action understanding precedes imitation the observer can decide whether or not he wants to imitate the goals and intentions of the model. In addition, a goaldirected theory of imitation also gives room to creativity in imitation, because the way the goal is achieved is left to the imitator, whereas direct-mapping approaches have a rather automatic taste. Observing the imitator achieving the same goal in a more efficient way in turn might cause the model to imitate the new movement of the former imitator. This type of creativity, based on the decoupling of ends and means and on mutual imitation, probably plays a very important role in the evolution of culture and technique. Further evidence for our view that action understanding is the main mgredient for imitation comes from neurobiology. The recently discovered so-caUed mirror-neurones in the macaque monkey (di PeUegrino et al. 1992 ) can be considered a neural system for action understanding. These neurones, located in the rostral part of the monkeys pre-motor cortex (area F5), discharge during the observation of object-oriented actions. Each single imit seems to code a particular object manipulation, e.g. a precision grip on a seed. The cells do not fire if a different movement type (e.g. whole hand grip) is shown or if a different object is manipulated (e.g. larger object). Thus monkeys seem to have a neural system for action understanding, at least for object-oriented ones.
Interestingly, a mirror-neurone does not only fire during action observation, but also if the monkey executes the action the neurone is tuned for. Mirrorneurones were thus thought to be a good candidate for playing a role imitation. However, monkeys do not imitate, but their relatives, the great apes and humans do. Recently, a fMRI study (lacoboni et al. 1999) showed that the human homologue of the monkey's F5 mirror-neurone area is particularly active during the
